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THE DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
RicHA D

B. DYSONt

It is widely, though not universally, accepted that the corporate
director has the duty to be prudent and diligent in carrying out the
functions assigned to him by law and by the corporation itself. This
responsibility, the duty of care, probably developed from older concepts
in the law of trusts1 and agency.2 It has been more elusive, less absolute,
and more subject to exceptions than the other main duty of the director,
that of honesty and fidelity to the corporation he serves.3 One reason
for this might be that intrinsically it is not as necessary; it is possible
to have a system where honesty and fidelity are the only requirements as
far as the director's legal responsibility is concerned. Some states, a
small minority, appear to have taken that position.' Another reason is
that directors' negligence liability produces the irritating necessity of
dividing the indivisible, of determining the line between excusable and
actionable negligence, by little more than the venerable concept of the
reasonable man. It is, after all, the application of the law of torts to the
corporate director; and as with other branches of that law, it consists
of a simple basic doctrine with numerous qualifications, exceptions, and
mitigating factors.
The courts have indeed had their problems with it. The jury's wellknown sympathy for plaintiffs has caused the courts to keep a tight
rein through rulings on the sufficiency of pleadings and proof that have
been the procedural basis for most of the reported cases. These rulings
have necessarily been based on internalized notions of proper policy;
such notions vary widely from court to court, producing different results
from apparently similar rules. The doctrines have been too simple to
attract much help from the scholarly quarter. Furthermore, the very idea
of negligence in a managerial context seems to have been a difficult one
for some judges to accept.
After a brief look at the development of directors' negligence
liability, this article will consider the issues that appear to be live ones
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
1. See 2 Scorw, TRUSTS §§ 174, 201, 264 (2d ed. 1956).
2. See MEcHEm, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 524-32 (4th
3. See, e.g., Mobile Land Improvement Co. v. Gass, 142 Ala. 520, 39
Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944).
4. Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have apparently denied
directors for anything short of bad faith. See text accompanying notes

ed. 1952).
So. 229 (1905);
the liability of
121-24 infra.
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today: standing to sue, the causation problem, the business judgment
concept, and the standard of care.
Some Background Observations
There is nothing surprising about the origin of directors' liability
for negligence. The courts early likened them to trustees, who were liable
for negligently injuring the trust estate,5 and to agents, who were liable
for negligent harm to the principal's interests in carrying out their duties.'
In what is usually said to be the first case on the point, Charitable Corp.
v. Sutton,7 the court started out by calling the directors ("committeemen") agents and then went on to say that the directors, "by accepting
a trust of this sort," were "obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence" and therefore were "within the case of common trustees."
They were held liable.
Charitable Corp. differed little from more modern cases on the
subject. It embodied what was to be the most common factual basis for
suit: the persons who were placed in day-to-day charge of the business
(here it was a sort of quasi-business of lending money on collateral,
supposedly to allow the poor to escape the grasp of the pawnbrokers)
turned out to be dishonest. After they were apprehended or disappeared
or at any rate were unsatisfactory defendants, it was sought to hold
liable the directors who had entrusted the business to charlatans and
failed to supervise them adequately.
A distinction might well be made between the two main types of
case that give rise to negligence actions against directors. The first is
illustrated by Charitable Corp. In that type an officer, usually in a
managing position, has been dishonest or wildly imprudent, causing loss
to the corporation; the attempt is to hold the directors, who, though not
directly involved in the defalcations, allegedly "caused" the harm by their
failure to perform properly their duties of supervision. It is characteristic
of this type of case that there is no question that the underlying wrong
is actionable; the only question is whether someone other than the chief
wrongdoer can be made to answer for it. Although not legally innocent,
the negligent director has done no intentional wrong and his liability is,
in a sense, vicarious.
5. See Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N.E. 676 (1887) ; Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65,

70-74 (1880).
6. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. N.S. 68-78 (La. 1829); Horn Silver Mining
Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, 44 N.W. 56 (1889) ; Hart v. Evanson, 14 N.D. 570, 105 N.W.
942 (1895).
7. 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
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The other type of case' involves some act by a director that turns out
to be harmful to the corporation. Here the defendant is primarily responsible for the harm; there is no vicarious element. The question is
whether the misdeed involved is one that the legal system will force the
director to pay for by labeling him actionably negligent. Although the
courts have generally treated the two types of case with the same legal
doctrines, there are several differences between them. In the vicarious
case, the defendant has simply been inattentive--he has failed to perform
the duties that he assumed. In the non-vicarious case, the defendant's
fault is incompetence or recklessness. In the first case the policy that is
being applied is that of forcing directors to perform their minimal functions; in the second, that of making them act more circumspectly or
possibly even making them decline positions that they are not competent
to fill.
Non-vicarious liability has another function: to fill in some gaps
in the area of intentional director fault (that is, breaches of loyalty).
Often when insiders have been dealing improperly with the corporation's
assets, it is difficult for an outside shareholder or creditor to gather
evidence with which to prosecute a case against them. This is particularly
true with large corporations whose directors have their fingers in many
financial pies and can easily conceal their real motivations. Negligence
liability can be more easily proved in some cases; the damage is there, and
imprudence is the least of the managerial sins that can be inferred from it.'
One preliminary question that is somewhat unclear is whether banks
and non-banking corporations can be validly treated alike or whether
different rules must be applied. One state, Massachusetts, has established
different standards for banks (ordinary negligence)"0 and non-banks
(clear and gross negligence)." No other state has explicitly observed
this distinction; the majority purport to use ordinary negligence as the
standard in both cases. One obvious distinction is that banks have a
unique class of possible plaintiffs, the depositors. The nature of banking
and the type of assets that it deals with might tend to create a higher
standard of performance for the directors. On the other hand, bank
directors, outside of the great metropolitan banks, are often local citizens
8. E.g., Hi-Pro Fish Prod., Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark. 1963);
Levitan v. Stout, 75 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325
Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950).
9. See Bown v. Ramsdel, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N.Y.S. 573 (1929) ; General Rub-

ber Co. v. Benedict, 164 App. Div. 332, 149 N.Y.S. 880 (1914); Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
10. Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930) ; Greenfield
Say. Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. 252, 97 N.E. 897 (1912).
11. Allied Freightuvays v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950) ; Uccello
v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950).
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with no particular business skill, whom the community perhaps does not
expect to meet the standards of performance of the normal corporate
director. 2 The reason the question is raised is that until the federal
banking legislation of the thirties was enacted, bank cases far outnumbered
the others; and much of the law on the subject consequently was formed
by them. Since most courts seem to treat them alike, citing and discussing
them indiscriminately, I shall assume that the court in question views
the law of director negligence as the same for both types of corporations
unless it has stated otherwise.
The early cases, and even more the early commentators, spent much
time discussing the precise form of the proper "ordinary" (or other)
standard. The main conflict was between those who would set the
standard as "the ordinarily prudent man in his own affairs"' 3 and those
who referred to "the ordinarily prudent director."' 4 If one feels that this
distinction is rather fine, the feeling is justified. No significant differences in outcome developed from the distinction. Some seemed to feel
that the ordinary man lavished loving care on his own concerns, and it
was unreasonable to expect such assiduous attention from a director. But
it is doubtful that those who used the standard, as distinguished from
those who criticised it, thought of it that way. It is more likely that they
simply were trying to articulate the standard of care of a director in a
way that would be understandable to a lay jury. In effect, they were
saying, "Is this the sort of thing that you would do ?" Then, in answer
to the imagined question in the minds of the juror, "Do under what
circumstances?", they tacked on the thought, "in your own affairs,"
perhaps with the idea of inducing the jury to use its common sense
rather than its imagination concerning what it would be like to direct
a bank. This phrasing seems to have been misunderstood by those courts
that rejected it, some of whom treated it as though it meant an equivalent
amount of time and energy. Swentzel v. Penn Bank" went to some
length to reject the idea that a bank director would be obliged to spend full
time at that position, which it conceived the own-affairs test as demanding. This is, of course, absurd. A director's duties are rather
sharply defined, formal, and thus limited. The standards of care demand
12. See Warner v. Penoyer, 91 Fed. 587 (2d Cir. 1898) ; Wheeler v. Aiken County
Loan & Say. Bank, 75 Fed. 781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896); Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89
Tenn. 630, 15 S.W. 448 (1891).
13. E.g., Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 At. 621 (1901) ; Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65
(1880) ; Besselieu v. Brown, 177 N.C. 65, 97 S.E. 743 (1919).
14. E.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed.
1010 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1907) ; Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 283 Mo. 237, 223 S.W. 423

(1920).
15. 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892).
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essentially two things from the directors: that they be present at the
meetings at which they perform their duties and that they exercise a
reasonable judgment during these meetings.
Part of the confusion over the quantity of performance demanded
undoubtedly arose because a common source of director-negligence litigation was the director who simply absented himself altogether while the
operating managers robbed the business. But directors in general are not
required to perform any function of general investigation or informal
supervision, except where defalcations have already come to their attention. And there the most normal method of investigation is to employ
a firm of auditors.
It seems clear now that the courts were always talking about the
"ordinary director;" no attempt has ever been made by courts to raise
the level of the entire business world by suggesting that the average,
ordinary director is negligent, although some commentators in their more
crusading moments have come close to suggesting that they are." Any
attempt to judge the conduct of a director by reference to a different area
of experience seems misguided. There is certainly little similarity between
the formal, statutorily-regulated world of the director and the amorphous
world of the ordinary man's own affairs. Throughout the period when
most of these cases were decided, the ordinary man did not even have a
bank account. Directors' liability must be decided ultimately according to
society's expectations of directors; and these expectations, like those in
other areas of torts, are formed primarily by the normal conduct of
directors themselves. The simplest formulation of the legal standard,
and one that is in common use today, is that "ordinary care"is required,
and its correlative default, "ordinary negligence," will be penalized. Despite the word battles, there is little or no evidence in the cases that courts
who chose some "ordinary" standard (that is, the middle ground between
slight care and extreme care) ever intended anything substantially different.
Another doctrinal conflict that is part of the history of director
negligence liability concerns the question whether the director is essentially
an agent or a trustee. Charitable Corp. v. Suttoni

used both words in

the course of the opinion. Chancellor Hardwicke said that they were
agents and that they were "in the case of common trustees." If he meant
only like trustees in their liabilities, he was observing the distinctions
and the problems of the analogy better than many judges after him. For
the problem with these analogies is that agency is too broad and trustee16. See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. Ra,. 1305 (1934);
BROOKLYN L. REv. 28 (1932).
17. 2 Ak. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch.1742).

Wormser, Directors-OrFiguresof Earth?, 1

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ship is too narrow to describe adequately the position of a corporate
director. A director is in fact and law an agent for the corporation, or
perhaps it would be more proper to say the board of directors is collectively
an agent. But attorneys and officers are also agents; the concept is not
helpful in defining specific liabilities. Besides, the question usually has
come up in connection with problems of the standing of shareholders or
creditors to sue the directors; and it seems fairly clear that a director is
technically not an agent of either. Neither are the directors trustees,
either individually or collectively; there is no trust instrument, no separation of legal and equitable estates. Unfortunately this line of analysis was
the basis for most of the formative decisions on standing,18 although today
it is accepted that a director is a sui generis fiduciary." If the courts
found that the director was a trustee for the shareholders, the shareholders
were allowed to sue. If he was merely an agent for the corporation, then
they were not. Similar types of analysis were applied to creditors.2" Of
course, more sophisticated judges probably made the underlying decision
as to standing on unstated grounds of policy and chose among the traditional doctrines to justify it. To this extent the controversy again
became merely semantic. At any rate, it does not play a significant part
in modern decisions.
Underlying these doctrinal skirmishes has been a question that is
perhaps more important both to the law and to society: whether directors
(and ultimately businesses themselves) should be supervised more or less
carefully by public agencies such as the courts. On one side is the
management community, its lawyers, and its other adherents who argue
that such supervision is an undesirable constraint on economic freedom
and economic development, that it is a constraint that makes men of
talent less desirous of accepting positions of responsibility and power.
On the other side is a more varied alliance of shareholder democrats,
economic progressives, and others who generally are of the opinion that
the public, in this case the investing public, needs more protection from the
ravages of management in-groups. The conflicting biases that these
positions represent are further complicated by the advent of the modern
gadfly shareholder who makes his living by bringing derivative suits
against directors and by the tendency of courts and legislatures to view
them with no more than an irritable tolerance.2' Each of the sections
following represents a way that a court that is so disposed might avoid
18. See, e.g., cases cited notes 5 and 6 supra.
19. See Uhlman, The Legal Status of CorporateDirectors,19 B.U.L. REv. 12, 15-16
(1939) ; Note, 82 U. PA. L. REa. 364, 366 (1934).
20. See generally Note, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 364, 369-71 (1934) and cases cited there.
21. See Note, Derivative Suits-Mechanics, Motives and Suggested Improvements,
36 B.U.L. REv. 78 (1956).
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holding directors liable for negligence. It is impossible to avoid the feeling
after reading the cases that the outcome is predetermined to a great
extent by whether the court is favorably disposed to the cause of action
in general. If it feels that such liability is a healthy thing, no difficulties
appear; the trial court's finding on the question of negligence, coupled
with loss to the plaintiff, is enough.
Standing to Sue
One issue concerning director negligence on which courts differ is
what categories of persons shall be allowed to sue the directors, and in
what posture (for example, individually, as a class, or derivatively) they
must present their case.22 This problem is characteristic of the corporate
field; it arises from the fact that the directors' primary responsibility is
said to be to the corporation itself and not to any groups of real persons
who are related to it. The derivative suit conforms to this idea, of course,
by utilizing the theory that the corporation is the complaining party even
where it is a nominal defendant. The only rights being ascertained are
those between the defendant director and the corporation itself. That is
not to say that the derivative suit presents no problems; it is one of the
perennial problem children of corporation law. There are the questions of
the necessity for demand on the directors and on the shareholders," of
contemporaneous ownership,24 and of other obstacles that have been
erected for the gadfly shareholder-plaintiff.2 5 Furthermore, as will be
discussed,2" it is not always easy to tell whether a suit is in fact derivative.
Any action that is not brought "by the corporation" in some form
raises the preliminary question whether the plaintiff is improperly seeking
to take the recovery for himself rather than channeling it into the corporation. The cases are hard to categorize because the standing question is
often seen dimly, if at all, by the opinion writers. Furthermore, there
are some differences that amount only to terminology. Where a corporation is insolvent and shareholders bring a suit to settle its affairs by
seeking to have the director-shareholders pay a judgment to the innocent
22. The question of standing to sue the directors is not, of course, peculiar to a
negligence action but occurs also in areas of intentional director fault such as fraud and
misappropriation of assets and with technical derelictions such as ultra vires acts.
23. See Stickells, The Requirement of Dennd Upon the Stockholders, 33 B.U.L.

Rxv. 435 (1953).
24. See Sykes, Right of Shareholder to Attack Transactions Occurring Prior to

His Acquisition of Stock, 4 MD. L. REv. 380 (1940).
25.

See Kaufman v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ;

CAL.

CoRe.

CODE

§ 834; N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 61-b; Note, Statute of Limitations and Shareholders'
DerivativeActions, 56 CoLum. L. RZEv. 106 (1956).
26. See text accompanying notes 36-46 infra.
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shareholders for the damage they caused the corporation,17 there seems
to be no effective difference from a derivative suit, although the opinion
might not mention the right of the corporation itself. Since the corporation is defunct, there is no question of paying the recovery into the
treasury. The key question is whether it is damage to the corporation
rather than to the shareholders themselves. If it is the latter, then
it would seem that the suit could have been brought while the corporation was still operating for the diminution in value of the shares.
That, of course, raises the question whether such damage is sufficiently
definite and ascertainable to be recoverable. If so, then it would seem
that any measurable damage to the corporation can be translated into
pro rata diminution of value of the shares and therefore, logically, is
recoverable. Which brings us back to the original question whether
shareholders have standing to sue other than derivatively.
First, however, it will be useful to enumerate the parties whose standing is no problem. The most common and perhaps the most obvious of
these are receivers or trustees in bankruptcy. They represent the right of
the corporation as such, for the interest of all the creditors and shareholders, and have no personal interest in the recovery so that they are
"ideal" plaintiffs from a theoretical standpoint."
Another obvious case where standing is not an issue is one where
the corporation itself brings the suit through its normally elected officers
27. E.g., Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950) ; Boyd
v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 84 So. 16 (1920).
28. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 72a (rev. ed. 1946).
In two cases the courts seemed to misunderstand this principle and analyze the rights
of the trustee in bankruptcy in terms of the rights of creditors. In Skinner v. Hulsey,
103 Fla. 713, 138 So. 769 (1932), the court said,
But since a trustee in bankruptcy . . . does not represent the bankrupt but
represents the creditors only, it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence
that, while a trustee in bankruptcy may have a right to sue for damages resulting
from a breach of duty on the part of corporation directors, which breach of
duty has resulted in some legal injury to the rights of the creditors of the
corporation, the right of such trustee in bankruptcy is limited to such suit only
as might have been maintained by the creditors themselves had no bankruptcy
proceedings been had.
138 So. at 772. It then proceeded to take a restricted view of creditor standing to sue
and held for defendants. Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N.J. Eq. 332, 192 Atl. 48 (1936),
took a similar view, although in that case it was less clear since all the shareholders
were defendants, and the court seemed to feel that the acts in question may not have
been actionable at all. Both cases seem clearly wrong. The Bankruptcy Act vests in the
trustee title to all "rights of action arising upon . . . the unlawful taking or detention
of or injury to [the bankrupt's] property." 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a) (6) (1958). He is normally thought of as acting for the benefit of creditors,
to be sure; but procedurally he assumes the rights of the corporation itself. Creditors
are often denied standing, in fact, for the very reason that the action should be brought
by the trustee, with the proceeds distributed equitably to all claimants. See, e.g., Hi-Pro
Fish Prod., Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark. 1963); Webb v. Cash, 35
Wyo. 398, 250 Pac. 1 (1926).
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and directors. 9 This is a relatively unusual case; in most of the cases
the corporation is insolvent, and in many of the others the alleged wrongdoers are still in office.
Some smaller classes of plaintiffs unanimously have been held to
have standing to sue directors for negligence. Beneficiaries of trust-type
accounts apparently can hold directors for losses caused by negligence.
For example, in one case"0 the successor trustee of an estate brought suit
against the directors of the trust company that had been the trustee and
recovered for the negligent mingling of the trust funds."' Depositors in
escrow accounts have been held to have standing to sue directors for
negligent loss of the funds, probably in cases where depositors would have
been barred from direct suit.32 One famous old case, United Soc'y of
Shakcrs v. Underwood,3 3 allowed the owner of bonds placed on special
deposit to sue the directors directly. In another case a trust settlor was
allowed to recover from the directors of the corporate trustee for imprudent investments. 4 In the few cases where they have appeared,
bondholders have been accepted as plaintiffs. 3
About one-third of the cases, however, do not fit readily into the
above categories but involve plaintiffs who seem to be suing "individually" in some sense-either shareholders in actions that are not
clearly derivative or creditors not represented by a receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy.
Shareholders. The uncertainties surrounding the standing of shareholders to sue directors for negligence reflect the ambiguities of the
shareholder derivative suit in general.36 At first thought, it would seem
that a derivative suit must seek to redress a wrong to the corporation by a
recovery accruing to the corporation. One difficulty with that formulation, as mentioned above, is that where the corporation is insolvent or
defunct, the recovery will normally be paid directly to the creditors or
shareholders. Furthermore, in derivative suits judgments are sometimes
paid directly to the shareholders where the wrongdoers are themselves
29. E.g., Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162

(1962).
30. Winn v. Harby, 171 S.C. 301, 172 S.E. 135 (1933).
31. See also Masonic Bldg. Corp. v. Carlsen, 128 Neb. 108, 258 N.W. 44 (1934);

Duncan v. Williamson, 18 Tenn. App. 154, 74 S.W.2d 215 (1933).

32. Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1944); Crews v. Garber, 188 Okla.
570, 111 P.2d 1080 (1941).
33. 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 609 (1873).
34. Finley v. Exchange Trust Co., 183 Okla. 167, 80 P.2d 296 (1938).
35. Chambers v. Land Credit Trust Co., 92 Kan. 30, 139 Pac. 1178 (1914) ; Dinsmore v. Jacobson, 242 Mich. 192, 218 N.W. 700 (1928) ; Wells v. Carlsen, 130 Neb. 773,
266 N.W. 618 (1936).
36.

See Develofnzents in the Law--Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,

71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 943-67 (1958).
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shareholders and/or still in control of the corporation, and it is desired
to keep the proceeds out of their hands." More uncertainty arises from
the variation in terminology from one decision to another. Is it a derivative suit where the plaintiff is suing "on behalf of himself and all
other stockholders" ? What about "on behalf of himself and all other
stockholders . . . who should come in and contribute to the expenses" ?

Or, "in behalf of themselves and all other stockholders, creditors, and
others similarly situated" ?" In many of these cases, a close reading of
the opinion will reveal that the suit is really derivative, as where the plea
or the decree calls for misappropriated funds to be restored to the corporation.41 The fact that the wrong is done to the corporation itself is
probably the only really essential element of a derivative suit.
In some cases where shareholder standing was allowed, the opinion
does not make it clear whether the court considered the suit derivative
or not. In some of the old cases, the derivative suit was not firmly
established; at times the courts seemed to feel that shareholders were, by
their position, in paridelicto with the directors whom they elected.42 This
line of reasoning has largely vanished from the cases in this century;
shareholders as such are no longer considered obliged to be well-informed.
The complaints sometimes combined a prayer for direct recovery
from the directors for losses on the stock, an essentially non-derivative
aspect, with a prayer for an accounting, which would indicate derivativeness if made to the corporation.4 3 An example is Burckhardt v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank," a consolidated appeal from two suits, each brought
by a shareholder of a national bank "on behalf of himself and the other
stockholders," against the bank and its directors. The relief sought was
37. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952

(1955).
38. Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y.S. 1059, 1062 (1911).

39. Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513, 514 (N.Y. 1832).
40. Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 289, 57 Pac. 287 (1899). Professor Ballantine
uses the "similarly situated" language to describe a class suit, which he distinguishes
from a derivative suit, but the language would not appear to have any definitive significance. BALLANTINE, CoaRoRATIoNs § 145, at 344 (rev. ed. 1946).
41. Foster v. Bowen, 311 Mass. 359, 41 N.E.2d 181 (1942); Hanna v. Lyon, 179
N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 778 (1904) ; Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y.S. 1059
(1911); Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928); O'Connor v. First
Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935).
42. See Dunn's Adm'r v. Kyle's Ex'r, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 134 (1878) ; Rich v. Shaw,
23 Me. (10 Shep.) 343 (1843) ; Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513, 535-36 (N.Y. 1832).
This position should not be confused with the situation where a given shareholder in

fact is found to have acquiesced in the actions of the directors. See Uccello v. Gold'n

Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950).
43. See Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 146 (1860); Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala.

503 (1857) ; Scott v. Depeyster, smpra note 42.
44. 38 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1930).
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to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the collection of the
indebtedness of the appellants to the bank, to require an accounting of all financial transactions of the bank, to have the court
make a finding to what extent and who shall be held and
adjudged liable for the losses and impairment sustained by the
complainant and all other stockholders of the bank.4
The acts complained of were basically mismanagement in that the directors
failed to take timely steps open to them to save the bank after the farm
depression of the early twenties. The bank's assets had been sold to two
other banks, which agreed to assume its liabilities. The agreement also
provided that the shareholders would pay a large assessment on their
stock. These shareholders were trying to prevent paying the assessment.
Certainly the injunction against collecting the assessment from the shareholders was in no sense asserting a right of the bank; it actually ran
against the interest of the bank. But the amount recovered from the
directors would in any event serve to reduce the assessment against the
shareholders so that the net result would be the same whether the suit
was derivative or not. This is inherent in the nature of a corporation;
at the point of liquidation, when the creditors have been paid or when
as here the shareholders are bound to pay them, the interests of the
corporation coincide with those of the shareholders. Nevertheless,
Burckhardt is a case where the shareholders were seeking to recover from
the directors for their losses, rather than those of the corporation, so
that at least as a matter of form, the suit seemed not to fit the derivative
mold."0
The Burckhardt case illustrates another characteristic of the few
cases where shareholders have recovered other than derivatively for
director negligence: the corporation was no longer a going concern.
Apparently, in no case since 1860 has a shareholder been allowed standing
to sue directors of a going concern for their negligence other than
derivatively or where there was "privity" of some sort.47 This factorthat the businesses were defunct-makes these cases less important than
they otherwise would be. One of the two main reasons for limiting shareholders' actions against management is to maintain the directors' control
over the running of the business, but when the business stops running
45. Id. at 569.
46. In a case concerning a close corporation with four shareholders, one of the
shareholders brought suit for damages. Here direct recovery was apparently sought to
keep the proceeds out of the wrongdoers' hands; the case could be classed as a shareholder derivative suit with only one person in the class of eligible plaintiffs. Uccello v.
Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950).
47. The cases cited in note 43 supra have some non-derivative aspects which may
result from the courts' unfamiliarity with derivative suits as we now know them.
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this reason is eliminated. The other reason is the preservation of the
recovery for creditors.48 No cases were found where a recovery might
have bypassed the creditors, although there were two where the creditors
might not have been paid at the time the suit was brought, and they were
to participate in the recovery.49 So, where the corporation is being
liquidated, some courts have apparently felt that it was not necessary to
use the derivative idea since the main reasons for it no longer were
applicable.
The case where some misrepresentation has been made to a shareholder is an exception to the general rule; there individual standing is
allowed. This is so even though the cases that have arisen in the
negligence area have involved published reports or statements that were
available equally to all the shareholders."0 It is enough that the shareholder-plaintiff read the report, was misled, and suffered damage as a
consequence.
One clear test of whether a suit is derivative or not is the measure
of recovery. If the measure is the damage caused the corporation by the
negligence of the directors, then the right would seem clearly derivative;
if the measure is the loss to the shareholders, then the right is that of the
individual or perhaps of the shareholders as a class. In many cases the
test is inconclusive, of course, because the court does not precisely state
the theory by which the damages are measured, and often either theory
would give the same result. Usually it is damage to the corporation that is
measured since the courts talk about the actual transactions and the
losses involved in them. Only two cases were found where the court used
the amounts actually lost by the shareholders as the measure of damages.
One was Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby,"1 where shareholders of a failed
bank sued negligent directors for the assessments that they had been
forced to pay on their stock. The court appointed a receiver and brought
all parties to the corporation into the suit. The plaintiff shareholders
recovered the amounts that they had paid for their stock. The individual
nature of the suit was emphasized by the fact that the court allowed
interest from the time, when the bank was still open, that the evidence
48. Sometimes the reason given is simply that the wrong is "to the corporation,"
but this is not a complete answer. Where the value of the shareholders' stock is diminished by the negligence of the directors, there is no reason in tort law why the shareholders should not sue. The answer must lie within the structure of the corporation

itself.
49. Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W. 803 (1917) ; Warren v.
Robison, 19 Utah 289, 57 Pac. 287 (1899).
50. Trembert v. Mott, 271 Mich. 683, 261 N.W. 109 (1935); Smalley v. McGraw,
148 Mich. 384, 111 N.W. 1093 (1907); Childs v. White, 158 App. Div. 1, 142 N.Y.S.
732 (1913) ; Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898).
51. 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W. 803 (1917).
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revealed that their stock was worthless."
Having examined the exceptions, it still seems sound to state as a
general rule that the shareholder's right against a negligent director is
basically a derivative one, except where a misrepresentation is involved,
and that standing to sue in any other posture will probably be denied. 3
Out of over one hundred negligence cases that have been brought by
shareholders, only ten were found that raised any questions at all on this
point. ' These seemed to reflect a relaxing of the normally tight corporate
structure when the corporation was being liquidated. The present assumption of the passive position of shareholders, whose function is more
that of investing than anything else, logically leads to the conclusion that
the only relevant damage arising from mismanagement is to the corporation. The cases that have looked to the amount lost by the shareholders55
involved banks without an organized or active market for the stock, and
in these the conceptual difference between the amount actually paid for
the stock and the shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's assets
was probably overlooked by the court.
Creditors. Unlike shareholders, creditors are allowed to bring suit
individually against directors for negligence in some states; the various
jurisdictions divide about evenly on this point. The cases dealt with here
are suits by individual creditors other than trustees in bankruptcy and
receivers, bondholders, and persons with whom privity has definitely been
established. As with shareholders, it is not always clear from an opinion
whether the court considered the suit as an individual or a class suit;
sometimes the court ambiguously states that the suit is by "creditors." 6
52. 196 S.W. at 813. See also Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 84 So. 16 (1920),
where the award was of the book value of the stock
53. See the following cases denying shareholder standing to sue: Kelly v. Dolan,
233 Fed. 635 (3d Cir. 1916) (receiver had been denied permission to sue by court);
Kirchdorfer v. Liberty Natl Bank & Trust Co., 313 Ky. 446, 197 S.W.2d 608 (1946)
(one of only two shareholders failed to join corporation as plaintiff) ; Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930) (suit for "themselves and all other stockholders" held not derivative) ; Stuart v. Robertson, 118 Okla. 259, 248 Pac. 617 (1926)
(shareholders who lost stock through assessment could not separate wrong to them from
wrong to corporation) ; Craig v. Gregg, 83 Pa. 19 (1876) (suit was for amount lost on
bank stock).
54. Burckhardt v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 38 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1930) ; Wheeler
v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 Fed. 781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896) ; Smith v. Prattville
Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W.
803 (1917); Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 146 (1860); Wallach v. Billings, 277 11. 218, 115
N.E. 382 (1917) ; Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950) ;
Boyd v. Applewhite 121 Miss. 879, 84 So. 16 (1920) ; Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513
(N.Y. 1832) ; Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 289, 57 Pac. 287 (1899).
55. Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W. 803 (1917); Boyd v.
Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 84 So. 16 (1920).
56. Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929) ; Vujacich v. Southern
Commercial Co., 132 Pac. 80 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1913).
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It is clear that a suit by a creditor against a director for negligence can
only be brought when the corporation is insolvent, since otherwise there
is no provable loss to the creditor.
Both among the cases allowing suit by creditors 7 and among those
denying it,"8 the most frequent type of case involves the depositors in a
failed bank suing directors who either failed to pay sufficient attention
to a reckless or fraudulent manager or engaged in imprudent dealings
with the bank's money. Actually the term "most frequent" is only valid
in describing the pre-World War II situation; while there were dozens of
cases involving negligent directors of insolvent banks from the Civil War
to the end of World War II, there has been only one case concerning a
bank in the last twenty years; and that one, significantly, involved not
an insolvency but a merger. 9
One specific issue on which the courts have divided is the effect
of the failure of the directors of a bank to close its doors after they know
or should know of its insolvency. The issue is usually raised by a person
who deposited money in the bank after it allegedly was insolvent and claims
that defendant directors' negligent or deliberate failure to close the doors
induced a deposit doomed to be lost. Some courts deny creditors standing
to sue on these facts, usually declaring simply that creditors may not sue
directors in any case where there was no direct fraud involved; that is,
57. Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co.
v. Ehrich, 230 Fed. 1005 (E.D.S.C. 1916) ; Boyd v. Schneider, 131 Fed. 223 (7th Cir.
1904) ; Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087, 20 S.W.2d 186 (1929) ; Sternberg v. Blaine,
179 Ark. 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929) ; Vujacich v. Southern Commercial Co., 132 Pac. 80
(Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1913) ; Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203, 57 Pac. 1084 (1899) ; Frontier
Milling & Elevator Co. v. Roy White Co-operative Mercantile Co., 25 Idaho 478, 138
Pac. 825 (1914); Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N.E. 676 (1887); Pirott v. Heinen,
137 Kan. 186, 19 P.2d 723 (1933) ; Sweet v. Montpelier Say. Bank, 73 Kan. 47, 84 Pac.
542 (1906) ; Id., 69 Kan. 641, 77 Pac. 538 (1904) ; Forbes v. Mohr, 69 Kan. 342, 76 Pac.
827 (1904) ; Bank of Mut. Redemption v. Hill, 56 Me. 385 (1868) ; Patterson v. Minnesota Mfg. Co., 41 Minn. 84, 42 N.W. 926 (1889) ; Cole v. Brandle, 127 N.J. Eq. 31,
11 A.2d 255 (1940) ; Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902) ; Minnis v.
Sharpe, 198 N.C. 364, 151 S.E. 735 (1930) ; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N.C. 311, 24 S.E. 478
(1896) ; Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892) ; Grandprey v. Bennett,
41 S.D. 619, 172 N.W. 514 (1919) ; Seale v. Baker, 70 Texas 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888).
58. Bailey v. Mosher, 63 Fed. 488 (8th Cir. 1894); Hi-Pro Fish Frod., Inc. v.
McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark. 1963) ; Wilson v. Stevens, 129 Ala. 630, 29 So.
678 (1901) ; Skinner v. Hulsey, 103 Fla. 713, 138 So. 769 (1932) ; Proksch v. Bettendorf,
218 Iowa 1376, 259 N.W. 383 (1934) ; Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926) ;
Union Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S.W. 1012 (1899) ; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67
Mo. 256 (1878); Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N.C. 458, 130 S.E. 195 (1925); Hart v.
Evanson, 14 N.D. 570, 105 N.W. 942 (1895) ; Daniels v. Berry, 148 S.C. 446, 146 S.E.
420 (1929) ; Deadrick v. Bank of Commerce, 100 Tenn. 457, 45 S.W. 786 (1898) ; Conrick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Inter-Ocean
Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 123 W. Va. 541, 17 S.E.2d 51 (1941) ; Zinn v.
Mendel, 9 W. Va. 580 (1876) ; Killen v. State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N.W. 536 (1900);
Webb v. Cash, 35 Wyo. 398, 250 Pac. 1 (1926).
59. Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963).
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they deny altogether creditor standing to sue directors for negligence."°
Other courts allow this as a basis for direct suits by creditors. 6 North
Carolina's court takes a more complex position between these two. It
apparently draws the line between the case where the management of the
bank allows persons to deposit money in the bank after they know (or,
more particularly for our purposes, should have known) that the bank is
insolvent and the more typical cases where the bank has been ruined by
the neglect of the directors, allowing recovery only in the first instance.62
The rationale is that allowing deposit in an insolvent bank is a form of
direct fraud, by which the depositor, and not the bank, has been injured;
therefore, the depositor should be able to recover individually from the
directors. Thus, the doctrine is consistent with that of jurisdictions that
deny creditor recovery for negligence altogether; the practical difference
lies in the fact that most jurisdictions seem to consider the allowing of
deposits after insolvency to be just another case of director negligence.6"
The situation where some misrepresentation has been made to one
or more creditors is a broader category of which allowing deposits after
insolvency is a part. If the misrepresentaion is made directly to the
plaintiff creditor, then of course he has standing since there is no general
class whose rights might be affected by his recovery. For the purposes
60. See Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256 (1878); Hart v. Evanson, 14 N.D. 570,
105 N.W. 942 (1895) ; Daniels v. Berry, 148 S.C. 446, 146 S.E. 420 (1929).
61. See Delano v. Case, 121 Ili. 247, 12 N.E. 676 (1887) ; Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170
N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902) ; Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888).
62. See Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N.C. 364, 151 S.E. 735 (1930); Bane v. Powell, 192
N.C. 387, 135 S.E. 118 (1926); Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N.C. 458, 130 S.E. 195 (1925).
63. The North Carolina position is not free of ambiguity. In Douglass v. Dawson,
supra note 62, a depositor after insolvency sued the directors, alleging negligence in
managing the business and in allowing the deposit. Standing was denied because no
representations had been made especially to plaintiff, and therefore any recovery from
defendants should accrue to the bank through a suit by the receiver for the benefit of
all the creditors. In Bane v. Powell, supra note 62, a depositor sued another set of bank
directors for allowing deposit after insolvency; this time standing to sue was granted,
and Douglass v. Dawson was distinguished on the basis that in Bane there was no allegation that the bank was harmed by the negligence of the directors, and therefore the bank
had no claim on the assets recovered. If allowing deposit after insolvency is, as in Bane,
considered a direct wrong such that the depositor can sue the management directly, it
seems rather odd to make an exception where the insolvency is caused by the management's negligence on the grounds that the receiver should be the one to sue. Individual
standing created by a direct wrong should not be lost because a larger class has a cause
of action based on an indirect wrong. The more normal course would be to allow both
suits and subtract where appropriate the amount recovered by the individual depositor
from the judgment awarded the receiver. Furthermore, it seems wrong on its face to
imply, as did Douglass, that the corporation can recover for allowing deposits after insolvency; it is the depositors, not the bank, who are hurt by such transactions. Later
North Carolina cases have simplified the distinction, describing it as between a depositor
who loses his money through subsequent negligence (no individual recovery), and one
who deposits after insolvency. They ignore, perhaps happily, the troublesome fact that
both Douglass and Bane involved deposits after insolvency. See Minnis v. Sharpe, supra
note 62.
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of this article, this includes the case where the defendant director has
negligently allowed another to make such a misrepresentation.64
The other cases in this group involve negligently publishing or
allowing to be published a misleading financial report. It would logically
seem that the individual creditor should have standing to sue in such a
case. Shareholders who have been misled to their detriment by published
reports have been allowed individual standing. 5 It is true that a financial
report may be available to an entire class of parties, but usually not all
of them are hurt. The loss to the individual is caused by the particular
way in which he reacts to that report, and thus the facts are different in
each person's case. Nevertheless the courts again have divided on the
standing question in this type of case.66
A few of the cases allowing creditor suit involve situations where,
at least in the eyes of the court, something of a trust-type relation existed
between the creditor and the directors. In Minnis v. Sharpe," involving
a financial corporation that was not a bank but collected money from the
plaintiffs "to be applied on mortgages and deeds of trust," the court found
that there was a "trust quality" to the relation, distinguishing it from
the banking situation where the money passes to the bank, and held
that creditors could sue the negligent directors. Similar holdings have
been made in other cases where the relation was different from that of a
depositor in a bank. 8
Among the cases that have disallowed suits by depositors against
directors of a failed bank, the usual statement is that directors owe no
duty to the creditors of their corporation and hence are not liable to
creditors unless they actively defrauded them.69 This is a throwback to
64. See Cameron v. First Nat'l Bank, 194 S.W. 469 (Tex. Civ.
65. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
66. Allowing standing: Solomon v. Bates, 118 N.C. 311, 24
Grandprey v. Bennett, 41 S.D. 619, 172 N.W. 514 (1919). Denying
Mosher, 63 Fed. 488 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Cairns v. Du Pont, 135 Misc.

App. 1917).
S.E. 478 (1896);
standing: Bailey v.
278, 238 N.Y.S. 74

(Sup. Ct. 1929).
67. 198 N.C. 364, 151 S.E. 735 (1930).
68. See Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Ehrich, 230 Fed. 1005 (E.D.S.C. 1916)
(plaintiff supplier authorized corporate dealer to collect money owed to plaintiff; active
director-officers misappropriated proceeds, and inactive directors were sued) ; Frontier
Milling & Elevator Co. v. Roy White Co-operative Mercantile Co., 25 Idaho 478, 138
Pac. 825 (1914) (plaintiff had given goods to warehouse corporation for storage; they
were embezzled by president, and directors were sued) ; Pirott v. Heinen, 137 Kan. 186,
19 P.2d 723 (1933) (plaintiff had authorized defendant bank director to sell his farm
and deposit proceeds in bank, from which they were embezzled by cashier) ; Sweet v.
Montpelier Say. Bank, 69 Kan. 641, 77 Pac. 538 (1904) (plaintiff bank sent note to
defendants' trust company for collection; trust company went bankrupt before remitting
proceeds).
69. See Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926) ; Union Nat'l Bank v.
Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S.W. 1012 (1899); Deadrick v. Bank of Commerce, 100 Tenn.
457, 45 S.W. 786 (1898) ; Zinn v. Mendel, 9 W. Va. 580 (1876).
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the old controversy whether directors are actually (or are treated as)
agents of the corporation only, in which case they are only liable to the
corporation, or are trustees for the shareholders or creditors or both, in
which case they might be liable to either directly."' Courts no longer
struggle to fit corporate directors into either of these categories, but the
almost even split in the cases on the question of creditors' standing to
sue directors probably reflects the older doctrinal disagreement.
In Arkansas, the situation was changed by the alteration of a statute.
The 1869 corporation law of the state7 ' provided that the officers and
directors of a corporation would be liable "for all debts of such corporation
contracted during the period of any such neglect or refusal [to comply
with provisions of the act]." Later codes of 19272 and 1931 (the
present one) 73 contained no such provision. The omission was held to
preclude suit by creditors in a recent federal diversity case. 74
An old case in Texas held that a bank depositor could sue directors
for loss of his deposit when it was induced by negligent misrepresentations
of solvency.7" A later case," involving suit by a creditor of a non-profit
civic opera company, rendered uncertain Texas' position on creditor suits
against negligent directors. In a confused, rambling opinion, the court
of civil appeals seemed to say first that creditors could not sue unless the
corporation was insolvent and had gone out of business (implying, though
it was nowhere stated, that such was not the case here), and then implied
that the matter depended on whether there had been misfeasance or nonfeasance by the directors. The court went on to say that directors were not
liable to creditors at all except for "direct fraud" and finally held that
there was no liability here because there was no negligence, the losses being
merely a matter of business judgment. Aside from the negligence point on
which the case was decided, the most persuasive factor in the case may
have been that the corporation was still in business; in such a case it would
seem obvious that the creditors should proceed against the corporation
first. If the case is limited to that holding, then the older precedent
allowing a creditor suit may still be valid. Much of the opinion indicated
hostility toward creditor suit, however, so Texas must be considered
doubtful on this point.
Kansas statutes make it a felony to accept deposits in a bank after
insolvency and also make the officers and directors civilly liable to harmed
70.

See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

ARK. CoRP. CoDE oF 1869, § 24.
Ark. Acts 1927, No. 250.
Ark. Acts 1931, No. 255.
Hi-Pro Fish Prod., Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888).

76.

Conrick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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depositors."' Apparently no Kansas cases have been decided involving
suit by creditors of nonfinancial corporations, so whether such a statute
would have any carry-over effect is uncertain.
It is striking how often the courts considering this question have
failed to see the disagreement among the authorities or at least have
written their opinions as though the answer was reached by straight-line
logic from agreed premises. In Allen v. Cochran," for example, a 1926
Louisiana case, the court started by begging the question, stating that
directors are "merely the agents of the corporation." It finished by
quoting a passage from Corpus Juris that is notable for its dogmatism:
The directors of a bank are liable only to the corporation whose
agents they are for violation or negligence of duty; and in the
absence of actionable deceit, they are not liable to a creditor of
the corporation for loss suffered through the neglect of their
official duties."'
An Iowa case8" stands at the extreme in insulating directors from
suit. A trust company had been trustee of an estate, and the successor
trustee sued it for mismanagement in handling the funds; here, where
there had been direct dealing with the plaintiff's interest and it was not
even assumed that the director had acted in good faith, the court held
the defendant director not liable on the grounds that nonfeasance was not
enough. No other case found went so far to protect directors; generally
where the wrongdoing is specifically related to the plaintiff's property,
he will be granted standing to sue.
Causation
Causation is a ubiquitous problem in the law, and it is the most complex of the issues surrounding director liability for negligence. In law as
in other areas of experience, it is never entirely certain what causes what
or even what is meant by causing something. We can speculate, of course,
that if event A had not happened, event B would not have happened either,
but that leads us into a philosophical morass. We cannot run the reel
through the projector again minus event A, so our speculation is a purely
abstract, logical one, not one concerning reality. What we really mean
is that events like A are usually followed by events like B; or that events
like those preceding B, but with A not present, are not usually followed
77. KAN. GEN. STAT. 1949, §§ 9-2010, 9-1915. See Forbes v. Mohr, 69 Kan. 342,
76 Pac. 827 (1904).
78. 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926).
79. 7 C.J. Banks and Banking § 169 (1916).
80. Proksch v. Bettendorf, 218 Iowa 1376, 259 N.W. 383 (1934).
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by events like B. We wrap these conclusions up in simple statements like
"The director's reckless investments [A] caused the insolvency [B]."
When we look closely, however, each set of events is unique; we have
never before encountered a set just like those preceding this particular
insolvency. Furthermore, our judgment plays tricks on us: can we really
say that reckless investments (events like A) are usually followed by
insolvency (events like B)? Or, that insolvency is usually preceded by
reckless investment? Or, that cautious business practices are seldom followed by insolvency? Probably not, unless we define reckless investment
as that which is followed by insolvency. And that indicates another logical
pitfall, that of misplaced concreteness-or characterization. Often hindsight passes for insight; we call it "recklessness" because it was followed
by insolvency. If we had been on the scene, we do not know whether it
would have seemed reckless at all.
To compound the problem, the law requires more than but-for causation. It requires that the culpable aspects of the defendant's actions
be joined to the damage in a sufficiently close ("proximate") way to
allow the imposition of liability. We make no pretense that this is a
qualitative judgment; it is purely quantitative and subjective. The law,
in the person of judge or jury, decides it with a stiff upper lip because
it must be decided, and no one has come up with a better way.
In spite of all this, there are certain types of cases that are not too
difficult. These seem to be cases where the acts of the defendant are
thought of as positive (as opposed to an omission, where we focus on
what he failed to do) and deviant (where we confidently say that people
do not normally act that way) and cause an immediate and clear injury.
Thus, where X throws a knife at Y, not intending to hit him, but does,
we simply do not raise questions such as those above. We are confident
that X's negligence "caused" Y's injury.
In the corporate area, such immediate and clear injuries are not the
rule. Embezzlement by officers is the only type that is at all common."'
Normally injuries are financial and indirect-money unduly spent or not
received-and only become clear after some time has passed.8 2 That is one
way in which corporate negligence raises more difficult causation questions than, say, automobile accidents. Nevertheless, in many corporate
cases we are fairly confident of our causation ground. Where a director
makes a decision that clearly seems rash or stupid in retrospect and the
81. See, e.g., Mercer v. Dunscomb, 239 Pac. 836 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Minhis v. Sharpe, 198 N.C. 364, 151 S.E. 735 (1930); Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171

S.E. 501 (1933).
82. See, e.g., Hi-Pro Fish Prod., Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Ark.
1963) ; Crews v. Garber, 188 Okla. 570, 111 P.2d 1080 (1941).
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damage clearly seems related and measurable, our conclusion that he
"caused" the damage leaves us content, however vulnerable the conclusion
may be to logical attack. These cases fall nicely into the category of the
positive, deviant act.83
Many, perhaps a majority, of the director negligence cases do not,
however, contain factors making the causation question "easy." Not only
is the damage difficult to isolate and measure accurately, but the negligent
conduct consists often of the failure to take the proper action-either
not acting at all or acting in a way that shows insufficient prudence. Many
cases, for example, have involved the failure of directors to detect and stop
the damage being inflicted by a reckless, dishonest, or incompetent managing officer. In such cases the basis for saying that the directors' failure
to exercise sufficient supervision "caused" the damage is rather tenuous.
Of course, if we imagine a hypothetical director who prudently examines
the books of the company and conclude that he would probably find the
manager's misdeed, the problem seems simple. But a fallacy lurks here,
too. In order to conclude that an omission causes an injury, it is not
enough to be able to envision a prudent course of action open to the
actor that would have avoided the injury. We must logically show that
the only prudent (that is, non-culpable) courses of action open to the
actor would have avoided the injury. We can not simply mentally subtract
an omission from the chain of events; nothing must be replaced with
something.
Actually the same principle-that we cannot subtract defendant's
culpable act without hypothesizing something in its place-is more obvious
in the positive-act cases. In the knife-throwing case, for example, we can
subtract the act of throwing the knife and substitute an infinite number
of prudent and non-injurious acts that the thrower might have been doing
at that moment. If instead of a knife our defendant finds himself holding
a bomb about to explode, however, his choice of actions is far more
limited; and we are not satisfied to say that his act of throwing caused the
injury until we can imagine a prudent, non-injurious course of action
that was open to him. In the failure-to-act cases, therefore, logic demands
that the plaintiff convince the trier that reasonable prudence in the defendant director's situation would have dictated a course of action that
would have avoided injury to the corporation or other plaintiffs.
In the light of these formidable obstacles, one might wonder how
plaintiffs ever have surmounted the causation problem in holding directors
for negligent failure to act. The answer is that policy, to some extent,
83. See, e.g., Pool v. Pool, 16 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1944); Spiegel v. Beacon
Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937); Van Schaick v. Aron, 170
Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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diverts the thrust of logic. In the Theodore Roosevelt era, one of the
many corporate practices that engendered public indignation was the use
of figurehead directors whose only function was to lend a prominent name
to the enterprise or, at least, to give investors a false reassurance of safety
in numbers. One of the earliest and most eloquent expressions of this
feeling appears in a 1907 article by Professor Dwight:
The lesson to be gathered from the cases seems to be that,
although courts adjure directors to be good and to give some
heed to the companies they have honored with their "assistance,"
at the present time they are not required to be familiar with the
operations of the company (Wakeman v. Dalley) 84 they need
not attend meetings of the board if inconvenient to do so
(Briggs v. Spaulding)" they are not responsible for the misconduct of executive officers appointed by themselves (Wheeler
v. Aiken Co. Bank) 86 unless, indeed, the wrongdoing is so
palpable that it is practically forced upon their attention (Gibbons v. Anderson)"7 and if they persuade two or three of their
number to do all the work, the latter alone will be held responsible for a neglect of such duties (Warren [sic] v.
Penoyer)."8 Where else in human affairs may be found so
admirable a combination of distinction without anxiety, of
reward without toil? Would it not be well for the corporation
and society at large if penalties that are admitted to be proper
in the abstract were insisted upon until the prodigious number
of pseudo-directors who are now in evidence were "squeezed
out," and a really hard-working director, as distinguished from
an officer, became less of an anomaly than he seems under
present conditions ?"9 (Footnotes supplied.)
This article was not concerned with the causation issue as such. At
the time it was written, most of the cases on director liability had revolved
around the question whether directors had the "duty" to attend to the
business more than they had. 9 As it became more widely accepted that
directors did have obligations of diligence, holding them liable under a
84. 51 N.Y. 27 (1872).
85. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
86. 75 Fed. 781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896).
87. 80 Fed. 345 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1897).
88. Warner v. Penoyer, 91 Fed. 587 (2d Cir. 1898).
89. Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33, 42 (1907).
90. In Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 Fed. 781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896),
for example, the court was influenced by the fact that few skilled businessmen could be
found in small South Carolina farming towns. It came close to saying that unskilled
bank directors in such places were not negligent in entrusting the business to the officers.
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negligence theory for losses to the corporation caused by others developed
as a way of enforcing this obligation. It was at this point, starting around
the First World War, that the defense of lack of causation began to
appear."' Thus. a policy derived from society's attitude toward corporations collided with a traditional defense from the law of torts.
The policy, on its face, certainly seems to have plenty of moral weight
behind it. The board of directors in our corporate system is the final
repository of managerial responsibility, and it follows that a director
should not be able to avoid these responsibilities by simply staying home
and seeing no evil. The director's function is typically a supervisory one,
not especially onerous, to see that the officers in command do their job
honestly and competently. The public relies on the board to look after
its interests, in a sense, and therefore expects directors to be willing to
do the minimum required of them. On the other hand, as we have seen,
it is difficult to conclude, that a given director's staying home was a
proximate cause of the corporation's injury. The most practical rule on
the causation question may lie somewhere between the extremes of permissive logic and severe policy.
One of the difficulties in analyzing the various courts' positions
on the issue of causation is that the issue seems to be mentioned only
where the opinion writer feels that it disposes of the case. Thus, a lineup
of cases where causation is discussed presents an almost unbroken string
of victories for defendant directors.92 On the other hand, there are many
cases where the facts seem quite similar to those on the above list, and
the plaintiff has been successful. It would not be logically or legally sound
to say that all these cases "hold" against finding a causation cutoff, since
in some the lawyers may have overlooked the defense; and future cases
in the same jurisdictions may be decided differently where the argument
91. Aside from Killen v. State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N.W. 536 (1900), which
denied director liability for negligence altogether, the earliest case found in which
causation was discussed in an appellate opinion was Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v.
Ehrich, 230 Fed. 1005 (E.D.S.C. 1916).
92. See Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Barnes v. Andrews, 298
Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Ehrich, 230 Fed. 1005
(E.D.S.C. 1916) ; Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929) ; Holland v.
American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962) ; Wallach v. Billings, 277 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 382 (1917) ; Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630,
91 N.E.2d 765 (1950); Hathaway v. Huntley, 284 Mass. 587, 188 N.E. 616 (1933);
Trembert v. Mott, 271 Mich. 683, 261 N.W. 109 (1935); Martin v. Hardy, 251 Mich.
413, 232 N.W. 197 (1930); Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y.S. 1059
(1911), rev'd, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918); Henry v. Wellington Tel. Co., 76
Ohio App. 77, 63 N.E.2d 233 (1945) ; Killen v. State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N.W. 536

(1900).

Kavanaugh v. Gould, supra, is the only case among the above that was not decided
for the defendant director. In that case the New York Court of Appeals reversed the
appellate division to send the case to the jury on the issues of negligence and causation.
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is properly presented. The cases must nevertheless be given some weight,
particularly where inactive directors of no particular skill are involved.9"
One well-known causation case is Allied Freightways v. Cholfin.94
In that case Mrs. Cholfin was a dummy director of a business run solely
by her husband. The defalcations consisted of spending corporate funds
for the personal needs of the Cholfins. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court exonerated Mrs. Cholfin from liability for all the expenditures,
except those from which she benefited personally, on the basis that it was
not shown that her neglect was the proximate cause of the bankruptcy.
The court pointed out that "she might have been an ordinary housewife
with no business experience, so far as anything appears in the evidence,"
and that she probably couldn't have learned anything from the books of
the firm "unless she was skilled in accounting." It also said that even
the bookkeeper was not familiar with the details of what she was doing
and that although Mrs. Cholfin might have inquired of her husband, it
is doubtful whether she could have prevented him from doing what he
did. The opinion is thus ambiguous, with at least three possible interpretations of the court's reasons for concluding that Mrs. Cholfin could not
have caused the loss: (1) She was unskilled and not capable of understanding the corporation's affairs. (2) The affairs were so tangled that
even a normally skilled person could not untangle them. (3) Regardless
of what she knew, she did not have the power to influence her husband.
The second interpretation is weakened by the comment that Mrs.
Cholfin could have found out about the affairs of the corporation by
simply asking her husband; it seems reasonable to assume that a normally
prudent director who did not receive a satisfactory explanation from the
managing officer would make further inquiry, either on his own or by
employing experts. So the case seems to rest on the idea, vaguely expressed, that Mrs. Cholfin did not possess the skill and influence of a
normal corporate director. If this is correct, then the case is disturbing.
It appears first to assume that there is no requirement of skill; next it
93. For some of the cases in which relatively inactive directors were held liable,
see, Gibbons v. Anderson, 80 Fed. 345 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1897); Vujacich v. Southern
Commercial Co., 132 Pac. 80 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1913); Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203,
57 Pac. 1084 (1899) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 297 Ili. 555, 131 N.E. 103
(1921); Coddington v. Canaday, 157 Ind. 243, 61 N.E. 567 (1901); Folsom v. Smith,
113 Me. 83, 92 Atl. 1003 (1915) ; Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 Atl. 621 (1901) ; Dome
Realty Co. v. Rottenberg, 285 Mass. 324, 189 N.E. 70 (1934); Whitfield v. Kern, 122
N.J. Eq. 332, 192 Atl. 48 (1936) ; Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550
(Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Broaderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ;
Besselieu v. Brown, 177 N.C. 65, 97 S.E. 743 (1919); Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N.C.
378, 90 S.E. 414 (1916) ; Crews v. Garber, 188 Okla. 570, 111 P.2d 1080 (1941) ; Warren
v. Robison, 19 Utah 289, 57 Pac. 287 (1899) ; O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp.,

163 Va. 908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935).
94. 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950).
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reasons that since this director was unskilled she could not have prevented
the harm and thus could not be proximately related to it; the final step
is to say that since there is no proximate causation, our unskilled director
is not liable for want of prudence, either. The lesson for the fraudminded manager is to arrange for selection of unskilled directors, particularly relatives who have nominal ownership of the family assets; they will
not be liable as long as they pay no attention to the business."
An interesting comparison case, from the group finding liability
without dealing with causation as such, is Vs]jacicht v. Southern Commercial Co.96 In that California case a corporation that ostensibly ran a
wholesale and retail liquor business was investing its money in a distillery
operation. It solicited deposit funds from a group of immigrant laborers
for "safekeeping" and used them for its shady investments. When the
laborers sued for their lost funds, one of the defendants, the wife of the
manager of the liquor business, was apparently a typical dummy director.
(The active participants, including her husband, did not appeal.) The
court's opinion concerning her duties is worth quoting:
It is true that no directors' meetings were shown ever to have
been held, and no evidence was introduced showing that actual
knowledge was brought home to director R. E. Hansard [the
wife] of the condition of the affairs of the company, or its
conduct with respect to the money of plaintiff and his assignors.
On the other hand, this appellant did not testify or offer
any proof showing that she had no such knowledge, or that she
could not have obtained it by the exercise of ordinary diligence
as a director of the company. Where the business of receiving
deposits by a corporation is so general as it was with the corporation defendant herein, it must be presumed that the directors had
full knowledge of the manner in which such moneys were kept
or used; and unless a showing is made of some excuse, such as a
95. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), raises similar problems.
Learned Hand seemed to be mainly concerned with the fact that it was not clear
whether any intervention by a director could have prevented the harm, which was
caused by dissention and incompetence in management. But in one paragraph
Judge Hand noted that he was "not very well-suited by experience for the job he
had undertaken," and asked rhetorically, "Can shareholders call him to account for
deficiencies which their votes assured him did not disqualify him for his office?" If
we accept the main point of the opinion, that it was not shown that the burdens under
which this corporation labored could have been lifted by any directoral intervention,
then it seems very much beside the point to mention this director's deficiencies. Though
the emphasis is reversed, Barnes raises the same question as Cholfin: whether the lack
of causation is a function purely of the business situation or is related to the inferior
skill of the defendant.
96. 132 Pac. 80 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1913).
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protest offered by the director not consenting to the misappropriation and of steps taken by such director to prevent loss from
accruing to the depositors, such director becomes personally
liable to the persons damaged."
More extreme positions in both directions are possible. In Wallach
v. Billings, the court seemed to require that the plaintiff allege and prove
facts showing direct causation between the defendant director's inattention
and the loss to the business.9" As discussed above, the proof of absolute
causation by an omission is virtually impossible in a real-world situation.
On the other hand, though apparently no cases have taken this position,
it would be conceivable to have a rule that where directors are proved
negligent they become insurers for any loss that occurs during the period
of their negligence regardless of causation.
The question that divides most of the cases, however, is whether the
special deficiencies of a particular director should be taken into account
in determining the proximity of his negligence to the loss. I suggest that
they should not and that the question should be: Would a normally
competent director, exercising reasonable diligence, have discovered the
danger and taken effective steps to prevent the loss? The rule as stated
excludes two considerations. First, it is not concerned with the position
of a particular director within the corporate structure (that is, whether
his influence was such as to change management policy). It is fairly
familiar corporate law that a director can absolve himself from liability
for improper activities by informing the other directors of the impropriety
and suggesting and voting for a proper course of action.99 This rule is
sound, for otherwise the courts would either hold every director liable
for the action of a majority of the board or would invoke the causation
cutoff to hold none of them liable, since one director could not overrule
the majority. The liability of a director facing a recalcitrant majority
would depend entirely on the view the court took and not on what'he
did himself. It must be assumed, therefore, that if a redeeming course
of action is pointed out to the board, the board will take it.
The other negative implication of the suggested rule is that the
director's particular qualities should not be considered on the issue of
causation. The rule would postulate a hypothetical reasonable director
who finds himself in the shoes of the actual director in question at the
time that the proved negligent acts begin. Our reasonable director is not
a new creation in the case, because he appeared at precisely the same
97. Id. at 81.
98. 277 Ill. 218, 229-36, 115 N.E. 382, 386-88 (1917).
99. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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point when we were deciding whether the actual director was negligentan issue separate from and logically prior to the causation issue. If the
fact-finder concludes that our reasonable director would have discovered
the danger and taken steps to avert the loss (assuming, as discussed above,
that the whole board would adopt the reasonable course of action presented
to it), then causation is shown. If, on the other hand, it is as likely as
not that the reasonable director would not have anticipated or averted
the loss, then the defendant is exonerated. What I am suggesting, then, is
that we perform the same gedankenexperiment on the causation issue as
on the negligence issue; but instead of asking what the reasonable director
would have done, we ask whether it would have worked.
This approach would change the result in the Cholfin, case on the
most probable interpretations of the opinion. The fact-finder would ask
whether a reasonable director, appearing in Mrs. Cholfin's place on the
board at the time her negligence was proved to have begun, would have
discovered Mr. Cholfin's improper expenditures and whether he would
have prevented the loss to the corporation. It would not ask whether a
more diligent housewife would have seen the problem or whether Mr.
Cholfin's wife would have enough influence over him to force him to
mend his ways. Likewise in Barnes v. Andrews, ° Andrews' managerial
deficiencies would not matter; the court would only ask whether the
company's troubles were amenable to solution by a reasonable director.
Is this approach too hard on directors? Are we forcing them to
warrant their competence to meet an ideal standard of directoral effectiveness? The answer is no, if the usual approach to the issue of negligence
is used. For we do not reach the question of effectiveness--of causation-until after we have decided that this particular director was
negligent (that is, that he failed to take the care that the law expects of
him). This separation of the issues of negligence and causation is quite
characteristic of our tort law, although it is not logically necessary. Its
maintenance means that the fact of injury will not be sufficient to prove
negligence; it probably is not even relevant. This is well illustrated by
the director-negligence cases. Plaintiffs generally are required to show
that the defendant did something overtly below the standard of reasonableness, such as not attending meetings (the most common failing) or accepting the financial statements of the president with no attempt to check their
accuracy.'' It is true that some cases have included the word "skill" in
100. 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). See note 95 supra.
101. Again the V7itacich opinion is instructive. It states
to show "that she could not have obtained [knowledge of the
exercise of ordinary diligence as a director of the company."
context, this could, of course, be interpreted to mean that a

that Mrs. Hansard failed
misappropriation] by the
132 Pac. at 81. Out of
showing of incompetence
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their statement of the "ordinary" qualities that the director is supposed
to have," 2 but in practice this does not seem to be followed. Again looking
at Cliolfin, the court pointed out there that Mrs. Cholfin in fact did not
supervise the business at all, did not examine the books, did not act with
due diligence.0 3 The plain implication of this and the other cases is that if
she had done so that would have ended the matter. Thus, the cases tacitly
agree that a director may be incompetent as long as he is diligent and
prudent. But where he is negligent, the better rule is that incompetence
is no excuse.
Business Judgment

The idea that directors should not be liable in tort for "mere errors
of judgment" has been a recurring theme that began early0 and has
stayed late.' Although it is sometimes referred to as the "business judgment rule,' 0 it hardly qualifies as a rule. It seems to have been a reaction
to some of the more vigorous pronouncements on the need for director
responsibility,"0 7 a vague idea that directors should not have to fear being
sued whenever one of their ventures turns sour. The fear that it represents probably is ungrounded since the courts have shown no inclination
to make directors insurers of their sagacity (that is, to fail to require
proof of negligence in order to support liability). If the business judgment idea is no more than that a director who makes reasonable mistakes,
short of negligence, should not be liable, then it adds nothing to established
doctrine. If it says more, its soundness should perhaps be questioned.
The concept has actually been used in several different ways which should
be distinguished from each other.
In some cases the business judgment idea clearly has been no more
than a verbalization of a finding of no negligence. In one case, for
example,' a bank lent money on the Morris Plan to auto dealers with
used cars as security; it had the misfortune to be caught in the 1920
would be exonerating, but the facts and the subsequent language negate that. Mrs. Hansard's failing in the court's eyes is that she did not show ordinary diligence; if she had
and had made a protest and taken steps to prevent loss, the implication is that she would
have been absolved of liability even if her efforts were unavailing.
102. E.g., Keck Enterprises, Inc. v. Braunschweiger, 108 F. Supp. 925, 927 (S.D.
Cal. 1952) : "such care, skill and diligence in transacting the corporate business as might
be expected in his own affairs."
103. 91 N.E.2d at 768.
104. See Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 603 (1857).
105. See Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963).
106. Comment, The Business .udgment Rule: A Guide to Corporate Directors,
Liability, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 151 (1962); BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATioxs § 632 (rev. e.
1946).
107. See articles cited in notes 16 and 89 supra.
108. Williams v. Fidelity Loan & Say. Co., 142 Va. 43, 128 S.E. 615 (1925).
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recession. Although the operation seemed rather rash at the time, the
court found that it did not amount to actionable negligence-it was a
matter of business judgment." 9 This might be thought of as a quantitative
finding of no negligence. Other cases have used the concept to express
a sort of qualitative judgment by contrasting losses caused by "mere
mistakes of judgment" with those caused by directors' "wilful and intentional departures from duty, their fraudulent breaches of trust, their gross
negligence, or their ultra vires acts."' 10
Another group of cases seems to use the business judgment concept
to weaken the basic idea of negligence liability. Perhaps the causal implication is unwarranted, but at least the judgment language appears in conjunction with a weakened negligence doctrine. The most famous such
case is Spering'sAppeal, where the court said:
[W]hile directors are personally responsible to the shareholders
for any losses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or wilful
misconduct or breach of trust for their own benefit and not for
the benefit of the shareholders, for gross inattention and
negligence by which such fraud or misconduct has been perpetrated by agents, officers, or co-directors, yet they are not liable
for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so gross as
to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest
and provided they are fairly within the scope of the power and
discretion confided to the managing body."'
Like most of the opinions in this area, this one is subject to varying
interpretations; possibly it was only making the qualitative distinction
referred to above. It seems, however, to say that directors acting within
the whole area of management of the business are not liable even for
absurdly gross errors of judgment; to the extent that it does, it subtracts
from the usual range of liability."' Similar language appeared in a case
almost a century later:
All of the allegations in category B address themselves to the
matter of business judgment. Absent fraud, actual or constructive, the courts will not interfere with the management of
a private corporation."'
109. See also Burckhardt v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 38 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1930);
Bailey v. Babcock, 241 Fed. 501 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
110. 14A CJ. Corporationw § 1869 (1921), quoted in Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212,
73 So. 2d 747 (1954), and Van Antwerp Realty Corp. v. Cooke, 230 Ala. 535, 162 So. 97
.(1935).

See also Spaulding v. Hotchkiss, 62 N.Y.S.2d 151, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1946).

111. 71 Pa. 11, 24, 10 Am. Rep. 684 (1872).
112. See Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 AtI. 405, 414 (1892).

113. Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401, 406 (Ky. 1963).

See also
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Does the business judgment idea have any usefulness at all, or is it
just an affective expression of some courts' reluctance to hold directors
liable for their failures? It seems that it can be fitted into a scheme of
liability, starting with the conclusions reached in the discussion of causation. There it was suggested that once negligence is established, the defendant should not be heard to argue that his negligence cannot be considered the cause of the injury since his incompetence would have prevented him from averting the harm. The only question should be whether
a reasonable director in his shoes would have prevented it. The other
side of the coin is that the unskilled director is protected by his diligence;
as long as he attends to his duties, he will not be found negligent, and the
question what the reasonably skilled director would have done never arises.
The latter proposition is necessary to make the former fair, and this
is where the business judgment idea can be useful, although most courts
have arrived at the requirement of a strict showing of specific negligence
without it. The rule can be phrased as: The director who diligently attends
to his duties and exercises his best business judgment on the questions
facing him will not be considered negligent even if his judgment is faulty.
In other words, while the defendant should not be heard to argue that if
he had been diligent his action would have been ineffective, the plaintiff
should not be heard to allege that though the defendant was diligent his
action was ineffective.
There is some support for this approach in the cases. In Casey v.
Woodruff, a derivative suit involving a bond issue by the Erie railroad,
Judge Shientag said:
A director cannot close his eyes to what is going on about him
in the conduct of the business of the corporation and have it said
that he is exercising business judgment. Courts have properly
decided to give directors a wide latitude in the management of
the affairs of a corporation provided always that judgment, and
that means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them. 14
Although the judge may not have had in mind the precise formulation
made in this article, he seemed clearly to be contrasting the director who
acts erroneously with the one who does not act at all. 115
Fielding v. Allen, 90 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Holland v. American Founders
Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962) ; Foster v. Bowen, 311 Mass. 359, 41
N.E.2d 181 (1942) ; Rous v. Carlisle, 261 App. Div. 432, 26 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1941), aff'd.
290 N.Y. 869, 50 N.E.2d 250 (1943).
114. 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
115. See also Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Lynch v
Sapiro, 117 N.J. Eq. 485, 176 AUt. 327 (1935).
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This approach does leave some loose ends. There are situations
where we do want to hold directors liable for their acts, not their omissions-where their negligence is positive, not negative. What about
directors such as those in Hun v. Cary,"6 who, at a time when their bank
was doing badly and they should have been retrenching or winding up the
business, threw their dwindling resources into an elaborate new building?
I think that these cases can be handled within the foregoing guidelines if
the distinction between prudence and skill, or the lack of these qualities,
is carefully observed.
The only failing that is "forgiven" by the business judgment concept is lack of skill. Lack of prudence may be manifested, as in the usual
case, by failing to pay attention to the business at all; but it may also be
shown by deliberately taking a longer chance than is reasonable for that
particular business. This seems to be the case in Hun, and therefore
business judgment would not be a defense. It may be objected that skill
and prudence can not be neatly separated, that the unskilled director may
not be aware of what the prudent course of action is, and that therefore
what appears to be lack of prudence may be the result of incompetence, not
recklessness. The answer must be that if in Hun the directors did take all
reasonable steps to ascertain what the prudent course of action was but
because of their incompetence were not capable of understanding the
answer, then they probably should not be held liable. Such a case would be
very rare, however, because a director who is unskilled will normally be
held to be aware of his weakness and of the consequent necessity to consult
wiser counsel before making important decisions.
The case of Litwin v. Allen"7. does not fall nicely into the category
of conscious recklessness, and it certainly does not involve an omission,
yet as in Hun the imposition of liability seems proper. There the directors
of the Guaranty Trust Company, certainly of the highly skilled variety,
bought railroad bonds in the declining market of late 1930 and granted
the seller a repurchase option that forced Guaranty to hold them for six
months and absorb any capital loss that might occur but that precluded
any capital gain if the market should turn strong. The deal was, on its
face, inexplicable. No motivation, business or personal, was in evidence,
and one can only surmise that the answer lay in the complex interdependencies of high finance in those troubled times. This seems to be a case
where negligence was a convenient means to impose liability where a
more serious breach, such as disloyalty to the corporation, may have been
in the background. Again, however, the business judgment idea is quite
116. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
117. 25 N.Y.S. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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properly not applied, for it does not seem to fit the pattern of honest
directors doing their best when their best was not good enough.
Standard of Care
At least three-quarters of the jurisdictions use ordinary care as the
standard in director negligence cases. More fully, they state the rule as
"that care that an ordinarily prudent man gives to his own affairs.""'
As discussed above, some courts prefer to put it as the care that an
"ordinary director" would devote to the business," 9 but no significant
difference in result has appeared from the two formulations.
This is not to say that all the courts tend to treat like cases alike.
One of the most common settings for a negligence case is a group of
inactive directors who leave the management of the business, often a bank,
to a managing officer who turns out to be dishonest. Even courts that
agree on the verbal standard divide sharply on the question whether
failure of the directors to examine the accounts regularly or thoroughly
or to employ independent auditors to do it is sufficient basis for their
liability to the corporation. 2 ' It is probably a safe generalization to say
that the standard used by a court does not help much in predicting how
it will rule in a particular case.
Some insight may be gained from the cases that deviate from the
norm. There is one group of cases that, for one reason or another, seem
to deny negligence altogether as a basis of director liability. Within this
group, some are really standing to sue cases, holding no liability to
creditors for anything short of intentional breaches.' 2 ' One state, Tennessee, has a statute that has been held to preclude director liability for
negligence,' 22 although one case circumvented it with a trustee analysis. 22
Wisconsin and Kentucky apparently have arrived at the same result, denying director negligence liability generally, by judicial decision. 4 There
are a few other cases that state the business judgment idea so strongly
118. See cases cited note 13 supra.
119.

See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.

120. Compare Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928), with O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935).
121. See Proksch v. Bettendorf, 218 Iowa 1376, 257 N.W. 383 (1934) ; Conrick v.
Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Inter-Ocean Cas.
Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 123 W. Va. 541, 17 S.E.2d 51 (1941).
122. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 45-218 (1955). See Jones v. First State Bank, 158 Tenn.
356, 13 S.W.2d 326 (1929).

Although the statute only applies to banks, no negligence

suits have been brought there against directors of non-financial corporations since 1880.
123. Duncan v. Williamson, 18 Tenn. App. 154, 74 S.W.2d 215 (1933).
124. See Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951) ; Security Trust Co.

v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401, 406 (Ky. 1963); Killen v. State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82
NAy. 536 (1900). But see Kirchdorfer v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 303, Ky. 446,
197 S.W.2d 608 (1946).
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that it sounds as if they are ruling out negligence altogether, although
they probably are not. For example:
As long as directors act in good faith, in the exercise of what
they believe to be good judgment, they cannot be charged with
culpability if they err, on the theory that the doctrine or the
principles which pertain to ultra vires acts become applicable, or
as for negligence.' 25
Although at first glance the judge seems to be saying that good faith
is enough, he most probably meant that the conscientious exercise of
judgment cannot be called negligence if it is erroneous since he held
that no want of prudence was shown.12
The second group of cases that deviate from the ordinary care
standard consists of those that unequivocally hold to gross negligence
as the standard. Just three states, Alabama, 2 ' Colorado, 2 ' and Massachusetts 2 9 seem to have settled into this category, although Massachusetts,
uniquely, splits its standard, adhering to ordinary care for financial institutions.'
A gross negligence standard originally established was later
changed in three other states: Nebraska,'' Minnesota," 2 and Pennsylvania. ' Pennsylvania effected the change by a 1933 statute,'"" and a
similar statute was directed at bank directors. 5 It is unclear whether
125. Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d 756, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
126. Ibid. See also Fielding v. Allen, 90 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; Inscho v.
Mid-Continent Dev. Co., 94 Kan. 370, 146 Pac. 1014 (1915); Beacon Wool Corp. v.
Johnson, 331 Mass. 274, 119 N.E.2d 195 (1954); Foster v. Bowen, 311 Mass. 359, 41
N.E.2d 181 (1942) ; Cairns v. Du Pont, 135 Misc. 278, 238 N.Y.S. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
127. See Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So. 2d 747 (1954) ; Van Antwerp Realty
Corp. v. Cooke, 230 Ala. 535, 162 So. 97 (1935).
128. See Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162

(1962).

129. See Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950);
Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950).
130. See Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930);
Prudential Trust Co. v. Moore, 245 Mass. 311, 139 N.E. 645 (1923); Cosmopolitan
Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 242 Mass. 95, 136 N.E. 403 (1922).
131. Compare Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, 78 N.W. 384 (1899), with Wells v.
Carlsen, 130 Neb. 773, 266 N.W. 618 (1936), and Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258
N.W. 639 (1935), and Masonic Bldg. Corp. v. Carlsen, 128 Neb. 108, 258 N.W. 44 (1934).
132. Compare Patterson v. Minnesota Mfg. Co., 41 Minn. 84, 42 N.W. 926 (1889),
with Lake Harriet State Bank v. Venie, 138 Minn. 339, 165 N.W. 225 (1917).
133. Compare Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892), and Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872), with Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905
(E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946), and Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa.
362, 199 Atl. 345 (1938).
134. "Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and
with that diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in their personal business affairs." PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2852-408
(1936).
135. PA. STAr. tit. 7, § 819-515 (1936).
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the bank statute, which omits the "fiduciary relation" and the "personal
business affairs" language of the business corporation provision, effectively sets up the same standard.'
In a recent case interpreting the Investment Company Act of 1940,""
a federal court found counsel "conceding" and itself agreed that lack of
prudence would not subject directors to liability; gross negligence was
required. 3 ' No citation was made to support this position. The only
apparent reason for this position is the act itself. It provides that no
charter, bylaw, or agreement
shall contain any provision which protects or purports to protect
any director or officer of such company against any liability to
the company or to its security holders to which he would otherwise be subject by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross
negligence or reckless disregard of the duties involved in the
conduct of his office.Y9
It further provides that the SEC is authorized to bring an action alleging
"gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" by an officer or director and
enjoining the person from acting in such capacity. 4 ' It does not logically
follow from either of these provisions that a shareholder should not be
able to sue for ordinary negligence. The first section, limiting the scope
of exculpatory clauses, certainly implies that such a clause could be
inserted insulating the directors from ordinary negligence liability; it
does not imply that the statute does this of its own force. No such
clause was mentioned in the opinion. The language empowering the
Commission to enjoin misconduct uses different language entirely and
would appear to have no relation to the rights of a shareholder. In the
light of the careful regulatory scheme set up by Congress, it seems
doubtful that it was intended that these directors should have a lower
standard of care than those of an ordinary business corporation.
A third category among the deviant-standard cases is characterized
by lip service given to the ordinary care rule with a noticeably lenient
decision on the facts. One of the most striking of these is a Maryland
case'. in which an officer-director of a wastepaper company, who was
also an eighty per cent shareholder, organized another company to manu136. See Chester-Cambridge Bank & Trust Co. v. Rhodes, 346 Pa. 427, 31 A.2d
128 (1943); Note, 10 U. Pirr.L. Rzv. 370 (1949). No observable differences in result
have appeared, however, from these verbal variations.

137. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1958).

138. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 550 (D. Colo. 1963).

139. 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h)-(i) (1958).
140. 54 Sta-t. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958).
141.

Burkhart v. Smith, 161 Md. 39 , 157 Atl. 299 (1931).
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facture paperboard from the wastepaper company's product. He milked
the wastepaper company, whose trustee in bankruptcy was the plaintiff
in the case, to keep the manufacturing company going; and both ultimately
failed. The court talked variously of fraud, gross breach of trust, and
ordinary prudence as the test, then said:
If there is no conscious betrayal of the trust reposed, there must
be such neglect or misconduct as amounts to a betrayal of the
trust. And we concur with the judge of the lower court in his
finding that the facts presented in this case do not justify a
finding of either fraud or negligence, or misconduct of the
kind described. 42
Wallachs v. Billings43 is another such case. There the court held that
a nonresident director would not be liable for leaving the business in the
hands of a manager who broke the bank by large loans to his own interests.
No other case was found that supported the position that nonresidence
would be a defense to a negligence suit." As mentioned above,1" the
court also took a rather extreme view of causation and held that the
pleadings were insufficient in this respect in spite of their allegation
that normal attention to the business would have uncovered the losses. A
later Illinois case distinguished Wallach, however, and adhered to the
normal test. 4 '
As a sort of special case in this lenient group, there have been a few
decisions that treated directors benignly because they were small-town
or rural types in an area with little skill to be found. These are closely
related, of course, to cases like Cholfin,

47

where lack of skill is found to

affect the causation element. In Warner v. Penoyer,'" for example,
honest farmers in upstate New York were held not liable for leaving the
bank in the hands of the cashier; the court was of the opinion that supervision in village banks could not be as rigorous as in city banks. 4 As
discussed above under causation and business judgment, lack of skill seems
142. Id. at 404, 157 At. at 301.

143. 277 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 382 (1917).
144. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
expressly held that nonresident directors' failure to attend meetings was a "tortious act."
145. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
146. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 297 Ill. 555, 131 N.E. 103 (1921). For
other lenient cases, see Burckhardt v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 38 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.
1930) ; Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087, 20 S.W.2d 186 (1929) ; Sweet v. Montpelier
Say. Bank, 73 Kan. 47, 84 Pac. 542 (1906) ; Id., 69 Kan. 641, 77 Pac. 538 (1904) ; Goff
v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928).
147. Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950). See
text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
148. 91 Fed. 587 (2d Cir. 1898).
149. See also Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 Fed. 781 (C.C.D.S.C.
1896) ; First State Bank v. Morton, 146 Ky. 287, 142 S.W. 694 (1912).
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a poor excuse for not doing one's best as a director, and one who does
his best is not likely to be found liable.
In the last group of deviant-standard cases the decisions are unclear
or contradictory. A striking example of self-contradiction is Keck Enterprises, Inc. v. Braunschweiger,5 ° where the judge said:
It was Braunschweiger's duty as president of the corporation
to exercise such care, skill and diligence in transacting the
corporate business as might be expected in his own affairs. He
cannot be charged with the consequences of mismanagement
unless it was so gross as to amount to fraud.'
The first sentence says that he has a duty to be careful; the second
denies any liability unless he is dishonest. The only possible way to
reconcile the sentences, it seems, is to define mismanagement in such a way
as to exclude lack of care, lack of skill, and lack of diligence. I doubt
that that is possible. The remainder of the opinion did not clarify the
standard since the holding of the case was that the president had acted
wisely on the occasion in question. The most common confusion of
standards has been the failure to recognize that the counterparts, in
normal parlance, of extreme care, ordinary care, and slight care are
slight negligence, ordinary negligence, and gross negligence. That is, the
absence of ordinary care constitutes ordinary, not gross, negligence. Keck
may illustrate that type of confusion.'52 Any supreme court is free, I
suppose, to redefine even common legal terms to suit its fancy; the
problem here is to decide which of the terms has been redefined."5 3
The other main source of uncertainty in standards is the question
whether directors should be held for conditions of which they had no
knowledge. Cases like Cholfin and Warner5 consider the question in
regard to directors of limited capacity; a few cases, however, have
150. 108 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
151. Id. at 927.

152. See also Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857) ; United Soc'y of
Shakers v. Underwood, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 609 (1893); Commonwealth v. Anchor Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 20 Pa. Super. 101 (1902).
153. New York has a long line of cases adhering to the ordinary-care standard.
See, e.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880); Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513 (N.Y.
1832); Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Platt
Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc.2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964). It also has a group of
cases that appear to deny or severely limit negligence as a basis of liability. See Fielding v. Allen, 90 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; Schwab v. . G. Potter Co., 87 N.E. 670,
194 N.Y. 409 (1909) ; Winter v. Anderson, 242 App. Div. 430, 275 N.Y.S. 373 (1934) ;
Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Cairns v. Du Pont, 135 Misc. 278,
238 N.Y.S. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1929). These expressions are largely dicta, however, in cases
where negligence is not really at issue and probably reflect judicial impatience at nuisance derivative suits in a busy system.
154. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
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suggested that no director should be liable in such a case. One court said:
Here persons who were directors in a corporation are sought
to be held individually liable for a conversion of property about
which they knew nothing, merely because, if they had examined
the books of the corporation, they might have ascertained that
the conversion had taken place. We cannot lend our assent to
the establishment of such a doctrine. It is doubtful, if this were
the established law, that responsible persons would be willing to
act as corporation directors. 5
Taken literally, such opinions make a distinction between an act and an
omission that has never been accepted as part of our law."' If a director
is indeed negligent, and his negligence is the cause of the harm (within
whatever formulation of causation the court accepts), there should be no
independent exculpatory significance in the fact that the negligence consisted of a failure to examine the books. I suspect that if pressed these
courts would fall back on a finding of no negligence. There has been
a tendency of some courts, more noticeable in the older cases than the
recent ones, to be repelled by the idea of liability falling on an honest
but inactive director. This feeling should be reflected in strict application
of the requirement of proof of negligence, however, rather than in a spinning of new doctrines.
155. Cohen v. Maus, 297 Pa. 454, 147 Atl. 103, 104 (1929). This case was decided
four years before Pennsylvania passed its statute codifying the normal rule. See note
133 mepra. To the extent that this case limited the liability of directors for ordinary
negligence, then, the statute overruled it. But see Chester-Cambridge Bank & Trust Co.
v. Rhodes, 346 Pa. 427, 31 A.2d 128, 131 (1943), which cited older cases for the proposition that directors are not liable for "nonfeasance;" the case may be construed as merely
finding no negligence. Compare Sweet v. Montpelier Say. Bank, 69 Kan. 641, 77 Pac.
538 (1904).
156. See Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 646-48, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5-6 (Sup.
Ct 1964).
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